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Sammendrag:. 
  I dette arbeidsnotatet går vi igjennom litteraturen på 
kostnader og nytte av geologisk karbonlagring samt 
kvoteprisar under Kyotoprotokollen i perioden 2008-
2012, og for perioden etter 2012. Ved å kombinere 
resultata for eit sett av ulike situasjonar finn vi at 
oppsamling og lagring av karbondioksid på kort sikt 
berre er økonomisk interessant i spesielle tilfelle, fyrst 
og fremst dersom gassen kan brukast til trykkstøtte og 
dermed gje opphav til større oljeproduksjon. På 
mellomlang og lang sikt, når betre teknologi er utvikla 
og kvoteprisen sannsynlegvis er høgare enn under 
Kyotoprotokollen, kan geologisk lagring av 
karbondioksid bli økonomisk interessant i fleire 
tilfelle. 
 
Abstract:  
In this paper we review the literature on the costs and 
benefits of geological carbon storage and the estimates 
of greenhouse gas permit prices under the Kyoto 
Protocol commitment period and beyond. Combining 
these results for a set of circumstances, we find that in 
the near-term Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is 
likely to be an economically viable option only in a 
small set of circumstances, particularly enhanced oil 
recovery. In the medium and longer term, with 
improvements in CCS technology and the likelihood 
of increased greenhouse gas permit prices, CCS is 
likely to become an economically viable option under 
a wider range of circumstances. 
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1 Introduction 
When in 1995 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that “The 
balance of evidence, from changes in global mean surface air temperature and from changes 
in geographical, seasonal and vertical patterns of atmospheric temperature, suggests a 
discernible human influence on global climate” (IPCC 1995), efforts to explore ways to 
mitigate climate change began in earnest. The UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, adopted in 1992, had already called for “stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system”. When the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in 1997, there 
was hope that it would represent a significant step in the right direction. However, the 
protocol has not yet entered into force. Moreover, the withdrawal of the world’s largest 
emitter of CO2, the United States, from the protocol, no emission caps on developing 
countries, and its relatively short time horizon (2008-2012), means that other, more ambitious 
measures will be necessary. 
Indeed, the significant emission reductions required to achieve the aim of the UNFCCC 
would require a large-scale shift in energy systems from fossil fuels to new alternative energy 
sources and substantial improvements in energy efficiency. It is, however, not very likely that 
such large shifts will be technically and economically feasible in the near future. One reason 
for this is that the development of the required technologies depends on a large and sustained 
research and development effort, which is likely to require some decades. Furthermore, even 
if the technology should become available, and at competitive costs, it will take decades to 
replace the existing real capital stock of the global energy system, buildings and infrastructure 
because of its inertia and vastness.  
On this background, other mitigation options such as “end-of-pipe” technologies are 
therefore increasingly being seriously considered by governments and businesses since they 
could play an important role in the transition from the present fossil fuel dependent economy 
to a future carbon-lean economy. A potentially very significant “end-of-pipe” technology is 
carbon (CO2) storage (also referred to as carbon removal or sequestration). There are three 
major storage options: biological (forests and soils), geological, and deep ocean. This paper 
looks specifically at geological storage. 
Geological carbon storage can be defined as the systematic storage of carbon dioxide, 
captured from fossil fuel combustion or processing, in stable geological formations such as 
hydrocarbon fields and aquifers, thus preventing its build-up in the atmosphere (Torvanger et 
al. 2004). We are concerned with three categories of geological storage: oil reservoirs, gas 
reservoirs, and aquifers.  
Before CO2 can be stored, it must be captured from flue gas. For geological storage this is 
feasible only for emissions from large stationary sources such as power plants with fossil fuel 
combustion, or industrial processes.1 There are several technologies available for capturing. 
We will not discuss the technical details of these technologies. (For a description of three 
important CO2 capture technologies, see Holt et al., 2000). After the CO2 has been captured, it 
must be compressed and transported to a location (by ship or pipeline) where it can be stored. 
These technologies are collectively known as Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 
technologies. 
1 In the case of biological storage, CO2 is captured directly from the atmosphere through 
photosynthesis.  
1 
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Oil and technology companies have invested significant amounts in research and 
development of CCS technologies over many years. The main motivation for this interest, up 
till now, has been the potential for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) through injecting CO2 in oil 
reservoirs. So far the only example of off-shore geological storage of CO2 is found at the 
Sleipner field on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, where Statoil has injected 1 million tons 
of CO2 in the Utsira aquifer formation since October 1996. 
The question we will explore in this paper is, whether, and under what circumstances, 
geological carbon storage can be a viable option for mitigating human-induced climate 
change. We examine cost estimates for the CCS technology and assessments of future carbon 
markets from previous studies. EOR is of particular interest in the case of oil reservoirs since 
this can lower the climate policy-related cost threshold for CCS significantly. We will 
combine this information to give an overall assessment of the economic viability of CCS as a 
climate mitigation option – today and in the near future.2 The information available about 
CCS technologies is sufficient for making rough cost estimates, such as ours, but do not 
permit a more comprehensive cost analysis – such as constructing marginal abatement cost 
curves for carbon storage. We will estimate a total cost per ton of CO2 captured. These 
estimates will not provide explicit information on what share is attributed to investment costs 
and to operating costs (for instance, if the CO2 is transported by ship rather than pipeline, 
investment costs would be less, but operating costs higher). Furthermore, possible future costs 
associated with leakages will not be analyzed.  
The paper adds to the literature on CCS by linking CCS costs per ton of CO2 to estimated 
prices per ton of CO2 equivalent in the Kyoto emissions trading markets. These costs are seen 
also in the light of sets of circumstances that reflect uncertainties regarding the development 
and cost of CCS technologies, and future permit prices at the international markets under the 
Kyoto Protocol. Beyond 2012 these uncertainties are even larger. Through this approach we 
can identify necessary, although not sufficient, requirements for CCS to be competitive with 
other mitigation options, such as energy efficiency measures, development of renewable 
energy sources, and biotic sinks.  
We divide the economic analysis into three parts. First we will look at the costs of 
capturing and storing carbon. We then turn to the potential for generating income from the 
capture and storage, first through enhanced oil recovery, and second as part of a greenhouse 
gas mitigation strategy. Finally we assess the economic viability of geological carbon storage 
under a set of different circumstances. 
2 The cost of carbon capture and storage 
The process of CCS can be broken down into three main cost components: carbon capture, 
compression and transport, and storage. Cost estimates will vary significantly between 
different fuels and types of processes (from e.g. coal-fired power production to ammonia 
production from natural gas). Capture costs will for example vary between coal- and gas-fired 
power plants – as the concentration of CO2 is much higher in the flue gases from coal 
combustion than from gas combustion. The transport costs vary between modes of transport 
(by ship or pipeline), and the storage costs between types of reservoirs (from oil and gas 
reservoirs to aquifers). In this paper we are concerned exclusively with carbon capture from 
fossil fuel combustion processes and geological storage.  
2 By near future we mean until 2020. However, in terms of relation to long-term climate policy and the 
temporary role of geological carbon storage, our time perspective is to the second half of this century. 
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A recent comprehensive review is Anderson and Newell (2003). They review the technical 
and economic feasibility of a range of carbon capture and storage options and estimate the 
current cost of carbon capture, for retrofitted or new power plants, to lie in the range of USD 
45-58 per ton CO2 captured.3 With near-term (2010-2015) technical improvements, they 
predict that the cost of chemical absorption of carbon in new coal and gas plants can be 
reduced to USD 34-42. In the integrated gasification combined-cycle process, coal is gasified 
to form a mixture known as synthesis gas (CO and H2), which is combusted directly in gas 
turbines. For this process, the authors estimated the current cost of carbon capture at USD 28. 
With near-term technical improvements they predict that this cost can be reduced to USD 17.  
Anderson and Newell estimate the cost of carbon capture in hydrogen production (from 
natural gas) to be as low as USD 10. Total emissions from these industries are, however, in 
the short to medium term small compared to emissions from power plants. 
Anderson and Newell quote transportation and storage costs of USD 5.50-15. They use a 
median value of USD 10 in their examples. In a breakdown of this combined cost they 
estimate transportation costs at around USD 1.40-2.70 per 100 km (pipeline), and geological 
storage costs at USD 1.40-8.20.  
Hendriks et al. (2000) estimate costs for CO2 removal projects in the Netherlands under 
various scenarios. They look at two specific cases that are of interest for our study: emissions 
from a natural gas-fired combined cycle power plant, and flue gases from a combination of an 
oil refinery furnace and a combined heat and power unit. They assume transport through an 
underground pipeline, and storage in aquifers and depleted gas and oil reservoirs. For a range 
of fuel prices and discount rates they estimate the following capture costs: Natural gas 
combined cycle USD 41-66 and furnace/combined heat and power USD 6-45. They estimate 
the cost of (compression and) transport per 100 km in a range from USD 3 for an annual flow 
of 4 Mt CO2, to USD 7 for an annual flow of 1 Mt. The estimated storage costs for an aquifer 
or gas reservoir offshore is USD 7-16. The cost range is as low as USD 1-8 for onshore 
storage.  
Hustad (2003) estimates the capture cost at Danish coal-fired power plants to be around 
USD 25, and for a Norwegian gas-fired power plant to be about USD 33-35. For ammonia 
production he estimates the cost to be USD 6-12. For all these cases, he estimates 
transportation costs to be USD 13 by ship or for an 18” pipeline (capacity 5 Mt/year), and 
USD 10 for a 24” pipeline (capacity 10 Mt/year). 
Hustad (2003) estimates that, overall, CO2 can be transported to, and stored at the Gullfaks 
production field, at a cost of USD 38-42 if a total of 5Mt CO2 is stored. If the total amount 
stored is 10Mt, the cost is reduced to USD 32.  
Johnson and Keith (2004) look at under what assumptions, and with what carbon prices, 
carbon capture and storage can be competitive (with the assumed technology of around 2015). 
They find that CCS can contribute significantly to carbon reductions when carbon prices are 
below USD 27 per ton CO2. This price can also be seen as the net cost of CCS. They find that 
new coal-fired power plants with carbon capture become competitive when carbon prices are 
around USD 20. Retrofitting existing power plants, is however, not competitive below prices 
of USD 82. Gas-fired power plants with carbon capture become competitive only at a much 
higher carbon price of USD 48. Johnson and Keith estimate the transport and storage cost to 
be USD 8.20.  
Holt et al. (2000) do not provide a detailed breakdown of capture, transportation and 
injection (storage) costs. They estimate the total CCS cost to lie in the range USD 29-45. 
3 Throughout this paper prices and costs are given as USD per ton CO2, unless otherwise stated. 
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Tables 1 and 2 summarise the capture costs and transportation and storage costs estimated in 
the cited studies.  
 
Table 1 Capture costs in USD/ton CO2 
Source Current cost Near-term cost 
Anderson and Newell (2003) 
- coal/gas power plant 
- integrated gasification combined-cycle 
- hydrogen production from natural gas 
 
 
45-58 
28 
10 
 
34-42 
17 
Hustad (2003) 
- coal power plant 
- gas power plant 
- ammonia from natural gas 
- integrated gasification combined-cycle 
 
 
25 
33-35 
6-12 
 
 
 
 
15-20 
Johnson and Keith (2004) 
- coal power plant 
- gas power plant 
 
  
20 
48 
Hendriks et al. (2000) 
- Natural gas combined cycle 
- Furnace/combined heat and power 
 
41-66 
6-45 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Transportation and storage costs in USD/ton CO2 
Source Transport Storage Total 
Anderson and Newell (2003) 5.60-10.80* 1.40-8.20 7-19 
Hustad (2003) 10-13   
Johnson and Keith (2004)   8.20 
Hendriks et al. (2000) 12-28* 1-16 13-44 
*Cost is given per 100 km pipeline. We assume an average transport of 400 km (Denmark or Northern 
Great Britain to North Sea oil reservoirs). 
 
3 Enhanced Oil Recovery 
Carbon storage has the potential of generating substantial income streams from EOR. EOR 
involves injecting CO2 to pressurize oil reservoirs in order to facilitate extraction of additional 
oil. EOR can potentially recover an additional 6-15% of the original oil in place, and thereby 
increase total production from an oil reservoir by 10-30% (Hustad and Austell 2003). This 
implies that the oil or gas extraction period for a reservoir is prolonged. Similarly, carbon 
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storage can also be used for enhanced gas recovery, and enhanced coal-bed methane 
production. 
Anderson and Newell (2003) claim that opportunities for enhanced recovery would be 
insufficient for larger amounts of CO2 storage. According to Torvanger et al. (2004), there is 
storage capacity for 33 000 Mt CO2 in oil and gas reservoirs in Western Europe, versus 
800 000 Mt CO2 in aquifers. Comparing this to the 1990 EU emissions of around 3 000 Mt, 
oil and gas reservoirs can then theoretically store all EU emissions for 11 years, while 
aquifers can store more than 250 years worth of EU emissions. 
The value of EOR depends on the amount of additional oil recovered per ton of CO2 
injected and the oil price. Typically the EOR response is around 0.6; that is, for every ton of 
CO2 injected, 0.6 tons of additional oil is recovered. With oil prices that range from around 
USD 15-25, we could expect an EOR income of USD 9-15 per ton CO2. 
The price paid by current EOR operations for CO2 lies in the range USD 11-18 (Anderson 
and Newell 2003). According to Hustad and Austell (2003), given an oil price of USD 18 per 
barrel, the average price paid for delivered CO2 in 2000 was USD 12 per ton CO2. Johnson 
and Keith (2004) claim that enhanced coal-bed methane operations might be able to pay up to 
USD 10 per ton of CO2. 
4 The carbon market 
With binding restrictions on emissions of greenhouse gases, the abatement or removal of 
emissions gains an economic value. To date, the most significant agreement that restricts 
emissions is the Kyoto Protocol. National greenhouse gas emission trading schemes already 
exist in Denmark and the UK, and more are planned before 2008. The EU will establish a 
trading scheme from 2005. Furthermore, it is likely that future international climate 
agreements will be negotiated. If the Kyoto Protocol enters into force, negotiations on a 
second commitment period (after 2012) must at the latest commence by 2005. In assessing the 
market for carbon storage, we will therefore take a look at studies on both the Kyoto Protocol 
and future climate agreements. The emphasis will be on studies dealing with the Kyoto 
Protocol, because the emission reductions and the market structure have already been 
negotiated, and there is much less room for speculation regarding likely carbon prices. 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol have committed themselves to reducing their greenhouse gas 
emissions. The Protocol also establishes three so-called flexibility mechanisms that Parties to 
the Protocol may use to help them comply with their commitments: emissions trading, Joint 
Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and each mechanism has its 
own type of permit.4 The Protocol states that reductions should primarily be achieved through 
domestic action, and thus the use of these mechanisms should be “supplemental to domestic 
action”.5  
4.1 Permit prices under the Kyoto Protocol 
The supply of emission permits depends on marginal abatement cost curves in each of the 
participating countries, the availability of competitive biotic sink projects, and the supply of 
4 Unless further specification is called for we refer to the trading units (quotas and credits) under all the 
Kyoto mechanisms as ‘permits’. 
5 There is, however, no definition of how “supplemental” should be understood, and this has been the 
subject of much debate.  
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“hot air”.6 The price, or prices, of the Kyoto Protocol permits will determine whether or not 
geological carbon storage will be a competitive option. 
 The literature on estimating permit prices is extensive.7 Most of these studies assume that 
the permit market will be a relatively liquid market with an equilibrium permit price. The 
paper by Springer (2003) provides an overview of model studies. In the 16 models that 
assume CO2 trading among Kyoto Protocol partners with emission caps (industrialized 
countries), permit prices range from USD 0.80 to USD 20.20 (with an average price estimate 
of USD 7.40). In general, when non-CO2 greenhouse gases are included in the models, the 
permit price is lower; estimates range from USD 3.00 to USD 10.40.8  
In the studies reviewed below, the price estimates, given in tons of CO2 equivalent (CO2e), 
range between zero and USD 15.9 While this is a relatively large range, most studies seem to 
indicate a permit price in the region USD 5-10 per ton CO2e as the most likely outcome. 
However, the different studies make widely differing assumptions, and therefore we check 
those assumptions in some more detail to be able to say something about the expected permit 
price. 
 The model used by Babiker et al. (2002), a recursive dynamic computable general 
equilibrium model, is particularly interesting in that it includes all the six Kyoto Protocol 
greenhouse gases. The inclusion of non-CO2 gases significantly reduces the cost of 
compliance in their model. This is because some of the non-CO2 gases offer cheap abatement 
opportunities. The paper explores two main scenarios. In the first scenario all “hot air” is 
made available, and all sink credits are used. The permit price is then estimated at below USD 
1.40 per ton CO2e. In the second scenario, it is assumed that Russia and Ukraine form a cartel 
to maximise their revenue from permit sales. The permit price then increases to around USD 
7 per ton CO2e. 
The study by Lucas et al. (2002) also includes all six Kyoto Protocol gases, but in a partial 
equilibrium model. With a competitive emissions trading market, they find that the estimated 
permit price drops from USD 1.65 per ton CO2e to USD 0.55 when they introduce non-CO2 
gases into the model (as opposed to a model with only CO2). If the former Soviet Union 
(FSU) countries act strategically and choose to bank permits, the permit price will increase to 
USD 3. 
Nordhaus (2001) employs an integrated economic and geophysical model of the economics 
of climate change to estimated permit prices. He estimates the permit price to be USD 15. 
Böhringer (2001) uses a static computable general equilibrium model to explore the effect 
of the US withdrawal under the Bonn accords (which include some sink provisions, but not as 
extensive as Marrakesh). Without the US, this model estimates a permit price of zero. 
However, with monopolistic permit supply by the countries in transition, the price will be 
positive. In the model it is optimal for Russia to restrict supplies to about 40% of their hot air, 
which will give a permit price around USD 15.50 per ton CO2e. 
6 “Hot air” is the term used to describe the excess permits allocated to Russia and certain Central and 
Eastern European states. 
7 We have limited our review to studies that consider international emissions trading, and where the 
United States is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol.  
8 The lower end of the price range is higher for models that include non-CO2 gases because estimates 
are based on different groups of models.  
9 In studies where the prices where not given in USD, prices were converted using the exchange rates 
as of April 10, 2003, which were USD 1 to EUR 0.927 and GBP 0.639.  
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Den Elzen and de Moor (2001) use a policy-support model known as FAIR. They estimate 
the permit price at about USD 2.50 with the Marrakesh provisions for sinks. The study is 
based on the IPCC A1B SRES scenario. When they run some of the other SRES scenarios, 
they find business-as-usual emissions to be equal to or below the Kyoto commitments, such 
that the permit price will be zero. However, in the A1B scenario it is in the interest of the FSU 
to limit permit sales to about 60% of “hot air”, and in this case the authors estimate that the 
permit price will most likely be in the range of USD 4.00-5.50 per ton CO2e. When they run 
the model for other SRES scenarios, they find permit prices in a range from USD 2.60 per ton 
CO2e, to close to zero (without banking). Banking all the “hot air” would push the permit 
price above USD 8. Using higher cost curves in the model raises the permit price above USD 
4.50. 
Hagem and Holtsmark (2001) use a static partial-equilibrium model that includes CO2 and 
non-CO2 gases (as a group). Without US participation, the permit price is estimated to be 
USD 5 per ton CO2e. The paper does not consider monopolistic behaviour. 
Klepper and Peterson (2002) employ a recursive dynamic general equilibrium model to 
estimate permit prices under various scenarios. Their study focuses on FSU and Eastern 
European market power in the emissions trading market. They run the model for a set of 
scenarios with different assumptions regarding the structure of the permit market in this 
region, and regarding what objective is maximised when they exercise market power. They 
find that permit prices range from USD 2.10 to USD 8.50. 
Jotzo and Michaelowa (2002) employ a partial equilibrium model in their study, which is 
one of only a very few that includes the CDM mechanism. They estimate an international 
permit price of USD 3.78.  
Michael Grubb (2003), p. 3, argues that emission permits under the Kyoto system have 
economic value only to the extent that “supplying governments are willing to issue and 
transfer them, and the governments of receiving countries are willing to recognize and use 
those units for compliance assessment under Kyoto”. It will be possible to identify the source 
of all permits, and governments “will use this capacity to meet strategic concerns, and this 
will make the Kyoto “market” vary widely from least-cost “market” behaviour” (p. 3). On the 
supply side, the Economies In Transition (EIT) countries (which have significant amounts of 
hot air), have an interest in restraining supply to raise price, i.e. to exercise their market 
power. On the demand side, Grubb makes an argument that the buyer governments will “use 
the mechanisms selectively and strategically to support their interests and the political 
legitimacy of the Kyoto system overall, whilst protecting existing domestic legislation” (p. 3). 
This will result in significant price differentiation among the different types of permits. Grubb 
indicates likely price ranges from USD 15-40 (per ton CO2e) for renewable energy CDM 
projects, to USD 3-12 for EIT transfers to other OECD countries (not EU). Within the EU 
trading system he indicates a price of USD 8-18. Grubb’s claim for buyer sovereignty seems 
compelling in light of the emerging evidence on the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Permits are being traded at widely differing prices; see for example Klaassen and Percl (2002) 
and Buen (2003). 
The price estimates from the cited studies are summarised in table 3.  
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Table 3 Literature estimates of greenhouse gas permit prices 
Source price (USD 
/tCO2) 
Comments 
Babiker et al. (2002) 1.40 
7.00 
- all six Kyoto gases with unrestricted emissions 
trading, with and without market power 
Lucas et al. (2002) 0.55 
3.00 
- all six Kyoto gases with unrestricted emissions 
trading, with and without strategic behaviour 
Nordhaus (2001) 15  
Böhringer (2001) 0 
15.50 
With and without strategic behaviour in the permit 
market. 
Den Elzen and de Moor (2001) 0-2.60 
4-8 
With and without strategic behaviour in permit 
market. 
Hagem and Holtsmark (2001) 5 CO2 non-CO2 (grouped), no strategic behaviour 
Klepper and Peterson (2002) 2.10-8.50 Varying assumptions regarding Russian permit 
market power 
Jotzo and Michaelowa (2002) 3.80 Includes CDM-mechanism, fixed sales of “hot air” 
Grubb (2003) 3-40 Disaggregated permit market 
 
4.2 Permit prices beyond 2012 
The Kyoto Protocol contains provisions for negotiating future mitigation agreements. 
Whether or not the Kyoto Protocol should enter into force, it is likely that other global climate 
agreements will be implemented after 2012. If the objective of the UNFCCC is to be met, 
then significant emission reductions will have to be undertaken through these agreements. If 
larger emission reductions are required than under the Kyoto Protocol, and without 
unexpectedly large and quick technological improvements, then carbon prices are likely to be 
higher in a future climate regime. 
It is difficult to estimate carbon prices under such a future climate regime. The estimated 
prices will depend heavily on the policy assumptions that are made: the size of the emission 
reductions to be undertaken, and the availability of mitigation options. Furthermore, the 
longer we look into the future, the more uncertain assumptions about economic parameters 
and technological change will be. Nevertheless, some such studies have been undertaken, and 
the price estimates they provide are the only ones that are available. 
Baumert et al. (2002) explore three different scenarios for burden sharing under future 
climate agreements. The 2030 emission target is the same for all of these. The target is 66% 
above global 1990 emissions, but 22% below the business-as-usual emissions for the year 
2030. With global emissions trading, the permit price is then estimated to be USD 26 per ton 
of CO2 equivalent. 
Johnson and Keith (2004) provide estimates for permit prices in 2026-2030 for different 
emission targets. The motivations for choosing the specific targets are not explained. With a 
50% reduction in CO2 emissions, they find a permit price of USD 23, and with a 75% 
reduction the price is USD 37. 
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4.3 The demand for geological carbon storage 
Having briefly discussed the future carbon market, we also need to explore the possible role 
of geological carbon storage in this market. Torvanger et al. (2004) discuss the relation of 
geological carbon storage to the Kyoto Protocol, and the need for clarification regarding 
reporting, estimation methodologies and accounting, as well as possible caps on its use. In 
this paper we will assume that geological carbon storage units can be fully used to achieve 
compliance. “Permits” or credits generated from carbon removal projects related to forest and 
agriculture in industrialized countries are denoted Removal Units (RMU) under the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
Recently there has been much debate around the merits of technology agreements, as 
opposed to “cap and trade” agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol is. In a technology 
agreement, countries would, for example, commit themselves to investing a certain amount of 
money in alternative energy research, and to sharing this technology with the other parties. 
With such an agreement there would not necessarily exist a carbon market. Without a positive 
price for carbon removal, there is no incentive to undertake geological carbon storage – 
except where income from EOR is sufficient to merit the cost.  
If the permit market behaves as a disaggregated market, with widely different prices for 
different types of permits, the question is what market niche geological carbon storage 
removal units will occupy. Environmentally speaking, sinks have less credibility than the 
other abatement options. There are two main reasons for this. First, by using sinks a country is 
putting off the long-term structural changes (shifting to a lower-carbon economy) that are 
necessary in the long run. Second, sinks carry with them an environmental uncertainty – in 
that there is a non-zero probability for some leakage of CO2 into the atmosphere over time.  
Countries that are major fossil fuel producers might see a strategic interest in supporting 
geological carbon storage: The use of sinks will reduce some of the downward pressure on 
fossil fuel prices that emission reductions would otherwise entail. Sinks therefore provide an 
opportunity for these countries to support climate change policies, while at the same time 
suffering smaller welfare losses from depressed fossil fuel prices (and sales). If governments 
do see such a strategic interest, then they might be willing to pay a premium price for removal 
units, or subsidize the development of CCS technologies. 
5 Discussion 
Based on the reviews of CCS options and costs, the potential for EOR, and price estimates 
from the carbon market under international climate policy agreements, we have created sets 
of circumstances to evaluate the economic viability of carbon storage as an option for climate 
change mitigation. We provide low, medium and high estimates for permit price and CCS 
cost intervals – based on the reviewed studies. Together these estimates produce nine sets of 
circumstances for the economic viability of CCS. These are presented in table 4. 
With respect to permit price, in the “low” estimate we assume a competitive international 
permit market under the Kyoto Protocol, where market power by Russia in particular is not 
fully exercised, but where all available CDM projects are carried out.10 These assumptions 
will, systematically, produce low permit prices in economic models of the Kyoto Protocol 
carbon markets. In this case, we estimate a price range of USD 0-5 per ton CO2. This estimate 
10 Russia was responsible for 17.4% of CO2 emissions from industrialized countries in 1990, and is 
allowed the 1990 emission level under the Kyoto Protocol. Due to the fall in output during the process 
of transition to a market economy Russia is likely to have a vast surplus of permits to sell. Therefore 
Russia could be able to exercise market power to try to increase the permit price and thus its earnings. 
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and the underlying assumptions are in line with for example Babiker et al. (2002), Lucas et al. 
(2002) and Jotzo and Michaelowa (2002). 
For the “medium” estimate, we still assume that the Kyoto Protocol is implemented, but 
this time that market power is exercised fully, and that due to institutional barriers and high 
transaction costs, (no or) only a limited number of CDM projects are carried out. These 
assumptions are in line with the results from Klepper and Peterson (2002) and Böhringer 
(2001). Our “medium” estimate is a price range of USD 10-15. 
For the “high” estimate we look beyond the Kyoto Protocol, and at a possible future 
climate agreement with more severe emission reduction commitments. Based on the studies 
cited above, we estimate a price range of USD 25-35.  
When it comes to CCS technologies, we have again made three different sets of 
assumptions that give rise to three different cost estimates. For the “low” cost estimate, we 
assume a low cost CCS technology, such as the integrated gasification combined-cycle 
process with near-term technological improvements (Hustad 2003 and Anderson and Newell, 
2003). We further assume that the CO2 is used for enhanced oil recovery. We then estimate a 
cost range of USD 7-21 (EOR income is USD 9-15 per ton of CO2). 
The “medium” cost estimate is based on the best existing technology for a gas- or coal-fired 
power plant (Hustad 2003), with medium transportation costs, and no income from EOR. Our 
estimated cost range is USD 40-50. 
For the “high” cost estimate we make less optimistic assumptions regarding the best 
available CCS technology for a gas-fired power plant (Hendriks et al. 2000, and Anderson 
and Newell 2003), and we assume high transportation costs and no EOR. Our estimated cost 
range is USD 75-95.  
 
Table 4 Net economic benefit of CCS under various assumptions (USD 
per ton of CO2) 
  CCS cost 
  Low* 
$7-21 
Medium 
$40-50 
High 
$75-95 
 
Low 
$0-5 
 
 
-2 to -26 
 
-35 to -50 
 
-70 to -95 
 
Medium 
$10-15 
 
 
-11 to +8 
 
-25 to -40 
 
-60 to -85 
Pe
rm
it 
pr
ic
e 
 
High 
$25-35 
 
 
+28 to +4 
 
-5 to -25 
 
-40 to -70 
* Includes income from EOR. 
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Table 4 shows that CCS very likely to be economically viable only in the case where costs 
are low and permit prices are high. The combination of a low CCS cost and a medium permit 
price can also be viable. These cases are marked with a grey shade in the table. For all other 
circumstances we find a negative net economic benefit of implementing CCS.  
These cost estimates confirm that CCS for enhanced oil recovery can be profitable. Such 
activities already take place at some oil reservoirs. CCS for the purpose of mitigating climate 
change is not competitive, and to our knowledge it is only being carried out at the Sleipner oil 
field in Norway, where the incentive is to save on a relatively high carbon tax. 
There are also reasons to expect that governments might see a strategic interest in 
developing CCS technologies, and therefore make investments or create economic incentives 
that lower the cost of CCS. One reason they would be interested in exploring the potential of 
geological storage is the fact that the major global fossil fuel reserve is coal. In addition, 
major coal reserves are found in the USA and in key developing countries like China and 
India. These developing countries are likely to achieve prolonged economic growth and 
related growth in energy use based on coal, since it is not probable that they will face 
(stringent) carbon emission caps during the next decades. The cost of coal can be competitive 
with oil and gas, given that most of the associated air pollution that leads to health problems, 
increased corrosion of materials, and crop damages can be removed through inexpensive 
measures. These countries may also be willing to subsidize coal extraction and use to some 
degree in order to save spending on imports of oil and gas and shield local communities 
dependent on coal mining. For such reasons, both the USA and many developing countries 
would welcome the development of technologies for geological carbon storage that could 
make this a viable option for combining a realistic energy policy with a climate policy. 
While the permit price and CCS cost estimates are independent of each other in other 
respects, there is a clear correlation over time. If we look beyond 2012 we expect carbon 
prices to rise, as long as more ambitious climate policy agreements are adopted, and we also 
expect technological advances to bring down the cost of CCS. Over time one might therefore 
expect to see a shift towards the lower left-hand corner of the table, where you find the 
economically viable circumstances. 
Even though we expect that carbon capture and geological storage will improve its cost-
benefit ratio over time, we also have to bear in mind that other carbon abatement options will 
develop over time. Cheaper abatement options might be developed, and this would lead to a 
downward pressure on the carbon price. Rapid improvement in renewable energy 
technologies could, for example, significantly reduce carbon prices, and make CCS less 
competitive. 
In our study we have said nothing about the potential for CCS and different permit prices. 
While we provide only rough estimates for the total cost of CCS per ton of CO2 stored, it is 
obvious that different combinations of sources and storage options will be competitive at 
different permit prices. We have not attempted to estimate the potential for geological carbon 
storage at different permit prices. However, it is clear that the theoretical potential of CCS is 
very large, and if CCS was to be used as a climate mitigation option on a large scale, it could 
significantly affect the prices in the market.  
We conclude that CCS is competitive today only under particular circumstances, primarily 
where CO2 injection can be used for EOR. However, in the near future (one decade) it might 
become a competitive abatement option on a larger scale if carbon prices increase and 
technical improvements lower the cost of CCS. This conclusion depends crucially on the 
assumption that a future climate regime will have binding quantitative emission reduction 
targets – so that there is a market for CO2 emission reductions or removal, and also that 
marginal abatement cost, and thus the permit price, is significantly higher than what is 
expected for the Kyoto period (2008-2012). Given the potential importance of CCS in a 
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transitory phase where a carbon-lean energy system is being developed, we expect that both 
governments and industry will be willing to spend resources on research and development of 
promising technologies, and also on the development of institutional foundations for this 
climate policy option. 
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